Iran’s Eastward Turn to Russia and China
A Conversation with Nicole Grajewski, Nader Habibi, and Gary Samore
Organized and edited by Ramyar D. Rossoukh, Assistant Director for ResearchMay 20, 2024
Since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been guided by the slogan “neither East nor West.” But lately, Iran has prioritized relations with the East, particularly China and Russia, more than with the West. What is driving these growing ties? Does it represent a new alliance of authoritarian regimes? In this Crown Conversation, we speak to Nicole Grajewski, fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and associate researcher with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at the Crown Center; and Gary Samore, Crown Family Director and Professor of the Practice of Politics at the Crown Center, about the significance of Iran’s eastward turn and its impact on the war in Ukraine and the Iran-Israel conflict. They address misconceptions about the countries’ shared goals, economic and military cooperation in the face of western sanctions, and impact on the regional balance of power, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
How would you characterize relations between Iran and Russia?
Nicole Grajewski: Iran’s relationship with Russia wasn’t always a seamless, perfect alignment. There was a lot of tension. From 2006 to 2010, the Russians supported United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. But at the same time, Russia was also involved in Iran’s civilian nuclear program through the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia also became the main arms supplier for Iran, partly because Iran had limited options. For years, the Russia-Iran relationship was really transactional, and there wasn’t much to it beyond just what Iran needed and Russia’s ability to provide certain expertise and equipment. Then the Syrian civil war happened, and that actually led to a shift in the relationship because the ties between Russia and Iran became much deeper and wider militarily and diplomatically.
But there’s always been friction in the relationship. The Russians would often be frustrated with the Iranians over their deception on the nuclear file, and the Iranians would think the Russians were selling them out. Then they both faced the same situation internationally. Russia became more hardline and isolated from the West. Iran initially appeared as if it would gravitate towards the West after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the 2015 agreement reached between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program. However, the Trump administration’s withdrawal in 2018 and the rise of hardliners in Iran prompted Tehran to pursue a policy that focused on the East. This confluence of factors led to closer cooperation, but the war in Ukraine definitely accelerated it and fundamentally shifted the partnership. Where Iran used to be reliant on Russia for equipment, now Russia became reliant on military equipment from Iran for the first time, and that led to Russia losing a lot of leverage over issues with Iran.
Gary Samore: The most important change has been closer diplomatic and military relations between Russia and Iran since the Russians invaded Ukraine in February 2022, which caused a tremendous rift between Western countries and Russia. That has given Iran much more flexibility in terms of being less isolated and feeling that the “Great Powers”—the permanent members of the UN Security Council—can’t come together to pressure Iran.
Before the war, Russians tended to view Iran as a junior partner, and there was a lot of tension and suspicion between them. Of course, there’s a historical basis for that as well. But after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin finds himself struggling to maintain Russian forces to win or, at least, to not lose the conflict, and that really strengthens Iran’s leverage, especially in terms of providing drones, helping Russia to manufacture drones, and supplying other military equipment. So, the relationship has fundamentally changed in the sense that Russia and Iran are more equal partners now, and the Russians are protecting Iran from international sanctions. They’re siding with Iran on international diplomatic issues, including a response to the April 13, 2024 Iranian attack on Israel. As long as Russia is stuck in this war of attrition against Ukraine, the Russian dependence on Iran for military equipment and support is going to continue, and in exchange, the Russians will provide some advanced military technology to Iran.
How would you characterize relations between Iran and China?
Nader Habibi: In Iran’s relations with both China and Russia, there is no ideological common ground other than rivalry and tension with the West. These are primarily transactional relationships that are driven by economic and strategic interests. China’s strong demand for oil and its neutral, non-interfering foreign policy has made it an attractive oil client for Iran since the turn of the century. China has also become the largest source of imports of manufacturing goods for Iran. All three countries have been targets of Western sanctions, which have encouraged some cooperation among them. For example, both Russia and Iran have welcomed the use of Chinese currency in economic transactions instead of the U.S. dollar. Yuan-based transactions are less impacted by international financial sanctions.
Ongoing Western economic pressures, which began soon after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, have forced Iran to turn toward China for the development of its oil and gas industry. Iran signed a 25-year oil and gas development project with Chinese oil firms in 2004, and there have been other agreements since then, including a 2021 comprehensive strategic partnership worth $400 billion. However, progress toward implementation of these agreements has been slow because many Chinese firms have been concerned about the U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. In international diplomatic initiatives such as the United Nations votes on Iran and nuclear negotiations, China has offered diplomatic support for Iran on several occasions.
To what extent have these relationships impacted efforts to halt or limit Iran’s nuclear program and concerns with Iran’s military interventions in the region?
Samore: The Russian invasion of Ukraine led directly to the collapse of the Vienna nuclear talks to revive the JCPOA. According to Rob Malley, the former lead U.S. negotiator during the Vienna negotiations, in March 2022—right after the Russians invaded Ukraine—the Iranians started to raise new demands in these talks, and by August and September the talks had basically ended because the Iranians were demanding things that the U.S. and Europeans weren’t prepared to give. For example, Iran demanded that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) end its investigation of past nuclear activities in Iran and wanted President Biden to guarantee that no future U.S. president would withdraw from the agreement, as Trump had done. Right after the talks collapsed in September 2022, it became public that Iran was providing drones to Russia. We don't quite know what Russia has provided in return but, according to press accounts, it includes advanced aircraft and air defense systems, and so forth, which is the weakest part of Iran’s military. So, if Iran can get access to advanced Russian aircraft and air defense systems that would really change the military balance of the region, especially these days when we’re looking at the possibility of a direct conflict between Israel and Iran.
Grajewski: Russia definitely doesn’t want to see Iran being subject to a military intervention, and that’s been a consistent position that they’ve had throughout the whole saga over Iran’s nuclear program. With the nuclear issue, Russia never wanted to see Iran get to the level where it is today, even though they didn’t push as hard as the United States or the European Union (EU). But, since the war in Ukraine, I’m not sure how much Russia is able to pressure Iran. They used to be frustrated when the Iranians defied the IAEA’s or the UN Security Council’s sanctions. Iran is making a lot of veiled nuclear threats about potentially weaponizing, but it is unclear what Russia would do or whether or not they have the influence to dissuade Iran at this point. That’s troubling because there was this history of longstanding Russian cooperation with the U.S. and the EU on Iran, and China kind of followed. But now that doesn’t seem to be the case, and it just presents far more challenges for the international community. Even with the recent events between Iran and Israel, Russia has pretty much stood alongside Iran, and that was actually remarkable because there has always been this tension where Russia would sometimes try to strike a balance with both Iran and Israel. What we’re seeing is this kind of partnership becoming entrenched by necessity. And it’s not part of a productive, broad vision, it just happened because of a bunch of external factors and a lack of alternatives.
I just want to add to what the Russians have given Iran because that’s really significant. As Gary noted, Iran is in need of advanced aircraft. There have been reports and actual video footage of Russia providing Iran with the Yak-130 aircraft. Iranians are training on this aircraft for potentially getting the Su-35 multirole fighter aircraft, which Russia hasn’t delivered yet. There’s been some controversy about the delay. The Iranians are saying the Russians aren’t delivering it on time. Previously, Russia was reticent about supplying Iran with this aircraft because they didn’t want to provoke any kind of backlash in the Gulf or with Israel. The Su-35 deal is its own kind of physical manifestation of Russia’s struggles with sanctions. Initially, they were supposed to be sold to the Egyptians, and then the Egyptians had to pull out because the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) extended secondary sanctions on any country dealing with the Russian military-industrial complex. Then, the Russians went to Iran, and Iran couldn’t pay for it. When the war in Ukraine happened, the Russians became more flexible with supplying the aircraft for payment in barter or gold. So, there’s this weird financial scheme, and the aircraft haven’t been delivered.
Also, Russia has been supportive of the Iranian space program, at least the civilian side of it. There has been cooperation between Roscosmos—the government organization managing space activities in Russia—and Iran’s civilian space industry, and the Russians are trying to help Iran send their first astronaut to space. But there’s also a military dimension to space and a lot of the requirements for a space program can be used eventually for the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), since they use similar technology. So, the space launch vehicle aspect could be one area where the Russians are contributing to this and potentially other areas that are intangible and unable to be tracked. But there could be some Russian coordination with Iran in providing information about military areas that Iran needs crucial help with.
Habibi: Like Russia, China has been a major source of military weapons, surveillance equipment, and protest control gear for Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Large quantities of weapons were sold to Iran in 1980 and in the early 1990s, but China reduced weapons transfers after 1997 in response to U.S. and international sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program. Since 2006, China has signed several U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and weapons transfers have been very small in recent years. At the same time military and defense cooperation between Iran and China has continued, and they have conducted several military exercises in the Persian Gulf. Russia has also participated in some of these exercises.
In the 1990s, Iran was able to advance its domestic weapons industry by reverse engineering some of the Chinese weapons. In recent years, China has exported drone parts to Iran, which has contributed to Iran’s success in the production and export of low-cost drones. China has also offered diplomatic support to Iran on several occasions during the nuclear negotiations, as well as expressed opposition to unilateral U.S. sanctions. Finally, China has indirectly supported Iran’s military projects through its purchase of Iran’s oil and by serving as its main trade partner. Economic relations with China have helped Iran (partially) resist international economic sanctions. Despite this support, however, neither Russia nor China are interested in Iran developing nuclear weapons.
Samore: The other thing I would say is that China is particularly sensitive to the risk that Iran’s nuclear activities could lead to a conflict that would jeopardize the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. The Russians also want to obviously avoid a conflict because that could hurt Russian interests as well, but the Chinese are particularly vulnerable to that concern now. Are the Chinese and Russians active in terms of trying to actually reduce tensions beyond pro forma public statements? The extent to which they work behind the scenes to discourage Iran from taking steps that could trigger an attack by Israel or the U.S. is much less clear. But I know the U.S. has certainly asked China to intervene with Iran on a number of issues, not just nuclear but also the Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea. There’s some evidence that the Chinese have raised these issues through diplomatic channels, but I’m not sure that the Iranians pay too much attention.
On April 13, Iran launched retaliatory attacks against Israel using drones and missiles. What has been the reaction of Russia and China? Do you think the shifts in Iran’s relationship with these countries as you all discussed earlier had an impact on its actions?
Samore: In the UN Security Council debate following the Iranian attack, both Russia and China blamed Israel for provoking Iran by bombing Iran’s diplomatic compound in Damascus and called on all parties to “exercise restraint.” I don't know whether Iran felt more free to attack Israel because of its relationship with Russia. A more important factor probably was Iran’s calculation that Israel was not in a position to start a broader conflict with Iran because Israel’s tied down fighting Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah and doesn’t have the extra resources for starting another conflict.
Habibi: I agree with Gary that both Russia and China have refused to condemn Iran’s April 13 retaliatory strikes against Israel. Immediately after the strikes, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, phoned Iran’s foreign minister to call for restraint and de-escalation, but he also claimed that Iran’s response was a legitimate act of self-defense. In contrast, China strongly condemned Israel’s April 1 missile attack on the Iranian Embassy in Syria, which provoked Iran’s response. China has a strong interest in preventing any type of regional escalation in Iran-Israel tensions that might involve other Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, China has been very critical of U.S. support for Israel and its veto of UN initiatives for an immediate ceasefire.
Iran’s decision to carry out the April 13 strikes was not influenced by its relations with Russia and China. Iran understands neither country will risk a confrontation with Israel or the U.S. to defend Iran. This is evident in Russia’s refusal to defend Iranian forces against repeated Israeli strikes in Syria for the past decade. Instead, Iran counts on China’s and Russia’s diplomatic support in the United Nations in the aftermath of the strikes. Iran’s decision to minimize the risk of any casualties and significant damage to Israel was intended to send a signal without provoking a major Israeli response. This decision was partly influenced by China’s diplomatic contacts with Iran, in which they asked Iran to avoid a response that might provoke a major regional conflict. China has tried to play a more active mediation role in the Gaza conflict, but without any success.
Grajewski: One thing that I noticed on Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-related Telegram channels and public messaging was that there was a lot of disinformation and fake statements going around after the strikes on Israel about Russia. Some of the accounts were saying that Putin said he would go and defend Iran if Iran was invaded. Another one shared a photo of Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defense at the time, saying that they’re giving Iran S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. And then you look at the Russian news, and this isn’t being shared. The Russians aren’t saying that; it was just made up on these Telegram channels. Even so, it reflects something broader in Iran: the individuals or factions that are more supportive of the current path Iran is taking are very favorable of this Russia alignment because it’s a bulwark for Iran.
I’m not too sure if the eastward orientation directly influenced this attack. But Iran definitely feels a lot more confident because of its relations with Russia and China. They’re also watching how the Russia-Israel relationship has changed since October 7, and since the war in Ukraine, and that gives them a bit of confidence as well. Russia capitalized on the Israel-Hamas war as a distraction from Ukraine. Whereas Russia has had ties with Hamas for years, they have maintained these ties under the pretext of supporting a potential peace process. Russia also maintained very close ties to Israel, but there was a complete 180° turn where Moscow became openly antagonistic to Israel. Russia is likely irked because Israel has allegedly supplied early warning systems to Ukraine. And Iran has obviously benefited from the deterioration of Russia’s ties to Israel.
What do you see as the biggest challenges to the Iran-Russia and Iran-China partnerships moving forward?
Habibi: Iran’s domestic politics could pose a challenge. I’m sure both China and Russia are monitoring domestic politics in Iran because there is a very strong divide between the sentiments of the ruling elite and ordinary people towards relations with China and Russia. This divide is visible whenever there is news of an agreement between the two countries. For example, in 2021, when Iran and China signed a 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership, the government and its supporters were very vocal in pointing out the benefits of this agreement for Iran. On the other hand, ordinary people were skeptical and expressed concerns that the agreement would allow China to exploit Iran and compromise its sovereignty. In addition, there was even pushback from some factions within the regime who claimed that the agreement was biased in favor of China. Although China and Russia have close relations with the Iranian government at present, a significant shift of power within the regime or a major political upheaval can lead to a reversal or significant revision in these relations.
Since both Russia and China are fully aware of this divide, even if they remain neutral in Iran’s external conflicts, Russia, in particular, might have an incentive to help preserve the Iranian regime in the same way that it has helped preserve Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The reason for this is that Russia’s long-term strategy in the Middle East requires the continuation of its strategic cooperation with Iran, or at least with an Iran that does not have good relations with the United States.
Samore: The other sort of immediate challenge to the relationship that Nader referred to is that both Russia and China want to maintain good relations with other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. So, Russia and China have to be careful not to provide things to Iran or cooperate with Iran in ways that antagonize Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. This limits their freedom of maneuver in terms of what they are prepared to do, and that may leave Iran dissatisfied that they’re not getting as much as they want. Russian military sales to Iran are a good example because the weapons that Russia provides to Iran for self-defense can also be used offensively against the Arab states of the Gulf.
Grajewski: Russia doesn’t have a strong economic partnership with Iran. That’s partly because they export and import similar products. As a result, the countries haven’t really been able to fulfill some of their economic proposals. A lot of their bilateral economic dealings just result in memoranda of understanding (MOUs), which don’t go anywhere. And one other thing that is actually quite interesting from the perspective of the war in Ukraine is that Russia is now competing with Iran on the black market for oil exports and actually using former Iranian illicit tankers to compete for markets in China and also in India, which introduces a new competitive dynamic that may intensify existing tensions.
Samore: I agree with that. I just have one thing to add. I don’t think Iran expects Russia to help defend them. If it did come to a conflict, the Iranians would be on their own. The Russians are in no position to intervene in another conflict. They have their hands full in Ukraine. From the Iranian standpoint, what they are looking for from Russia is weapons and military technology. They don’t expect a mutual defense pact. I also think it’s extremely unlikely that the Iranians are going to give Russia military bases in their country, but I would be interested to hear Nicole’s view on this.
Grajewski: There have been rumors coming from the Iranians that in some of the negotiations for the renewal of the Russia-Iran treaty on bilateral relations, which is an updated version of an old treaty meant to serve as an analog to the 25-year partnership between China and Iran, the Iranians might offer Russia a base. But that’s a big sore spot for Iran domestically and is forbidden in its constitution. When the Russians were using an air base for refueling during the Syrian civil war, the Iranians were so upset that Iran’s Parliament essentially kicked the Russians out. So, I don’t see the Iranians offering Russia any kind of military presence, but they might be willing to accept Russia’s covert support on some of these issues or technological transfers.
To what extent do you see these relationships altering the broader balance of power in the Middle East?
Habibi: The improvement in Iran’s relationship with Russia and China is partly a result of the deterioration of both countries’ relations with the U.S. The bilateral military cooperation between Iran and Russia since the Ukraine war has boosted Iran’s confidence in its regional policy as it hopes to receive advanced weapons in exchange for the drones and missiles that it has sold to Russia. However, if you look at the Middle East broadly, China and Russia both have good relations with several other Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Turkey. So, Iran’s improved relations with China do not necessarily alter the balance of power with its neighbors. Some of these countries are even more important than Iran as trade partners for China. For example, Iran-China trade in 2023 was about $32 billion, but compare that with $107 billion in trade with Saudi Arabia and $97 billion with the UAE. China’s investments in these countries are also much larger than its investments in Iran. So, when it comes to disputes between Iran and its neighbors, such as the Iran-Saudi proxy wars, China remains neutral.
One new development in the past two years is that because China now has such a deep economic relationship with the Middle East, it is trying to mediate between regional rivals to reduce the geopolitical risks to its oil imports from the region. In 2023, for example, China played an active role in mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the restoration of their diplomatic relations. When it comes to Iran’s tensions with the U.S., Russia and China are happy to see Iran challenge the U.S. interests in the region, but China is less interested in Iranian actions that might destabilize the region.
Samore: I think that’s absolutely right. It’s one of the important reasons why both Russia and China do not want to see a broader regional conflict between Iran and other countries in the region, whether it’s Israel or the Arab Gulf oil producers. That would put both Moscow and Beijing in an awkward position. To some extent Russia and China still have a common interest with the U.S. and Europe in preventing a war from breaking out, whether it’s over the nuclear issue or the recent exchange between Israel and Iran. But it’s hard to coordinate that common interest because relations between Western countries and Russia, in particular, but also with China, are so poor.
From Iran’s standpoint, the most important element of the Russia and China relationship is the protection they provide Iran from sanctions: both international sanctions, because obviously Russia and China will block any additional effort to impose new sanctions on Iran for providing drones to Russia, suppressing domestic dissent, or attacking Israel, but it also gives Iran more protection against purely Western sanctions. The U.S. and the Europeans are doubling down on their sanction strategy, piling more and more sanctions on Iran. But I doubt these sanctions are going to be very effective in changing Iran’s behavior, as Iran has ways of circumventing those sanctions due to its relationship with Russia and China.
Grajewski: Well, it’s difficult because I don't think that Russia, China, and Iran are in a cohesive alignment. China is still reluctant to have a bigger role in the Middle East, and China also has a stronger relationship with other countries in the Gulf than Iran, at least economically. Russia seems to be more in the “axis of resistance” camp and quasi-involved in supporting it, whereas China is taking a more neutral approach to the conflict while still not isolating Iran. The regional power balances have also been shifted because of the Iran-Saudi rapprochement and normalization. Turkey is also a part of this equation. Turkey has a strange relationship with both Russia and Iran in Syria but has broadly aligned with both since October 7. But the region isn’t fundamentally going through a transition because of the Russians and the Chinese. The Russians and the Chinese are mostly reacting to the changes that are happening.
Habibi: When it comes to Iran’s tensions with the U.S. and the balance of power in that respect, both Russia and China are interested in making sure Iran challenges and perhaps undermines some of the United States’ objectives in the region given their own tensions with the U.S. The fact that they are willing to do this itself also sends a signal. For example, on many occasions in the United Nations, we have seen that the U.S. has tried to gain support for a proposal that would condemn Iran. But either Russia or China, or both, have vetoed that initiative. So that is diplomatic support for Iran’s position. In terms of Iran’s nuclear policy, clearly neither Russia nor China are interested in Iran achieving its objectives because they don't want Iran to challenge them as a rival nuclear power.
At times in this conversation, we have spoken about Iran’s relations with Russia and China separately and at other times in terms of a broader alliance between all three countries. What is your take on this?
Grajewski: I’ve argued in the past that this wasn’t an “axis” because people often talk about Russia and China together without differentiating between the two. And the thing about the kind of trilateral relationship between Iran, Russia, and China is that, in essence, it’s not there. It’s bilateral relations between two countries, and then, on occasion, they all do a military exercise, but that’s pretty much it. You don’t see trilateral meetings or a formal mechanism to make this a cohesive bloc. Of course there’s involvement in other organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), but both of those organizations are very loosely structured. They’re not like NATO; there’s no new mutual defense. So that side of it isn’t really there, and this was mentioned earlier in the conversation, but there’s no mutual defense treaty between Iran and Russia, and there’s no mutual defense treaty between China and Iran, and even though Russia and China increasingly cooperate quite closely on military matters, there’s also no mutual defense treaty there either. So, it wouldn’t be an alliance or an axis. But there’s a kind of semblance of cohesion from shared internal concerns about domestic protests and instability and a common sense of marginalization from the United States. That is where there is a bloc, but that’s not really something you can always translate into policy, and it’s not trilaterally coordinated.
Habibi: There is some agreement among all three of them about Eurasia, meaning that they share a desire to limit the U.S. influence in that region. The most recent example is the similarity of Iran’s and Russia’s positions on the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Iran and Russia both wanted to make sure Azerbaijan did not compromise the border between Iran and Armenia by creating a land corridor between Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenia. Since 2019, Iran, Russia, and China have also conducted several joint naval exercises in the Oman Sea and Persian Gulf. These exercises are generally small-scale, and they do not represent a trilateral military alliance. The three nations are also interested in preserving the Bashar al-Assad regime and participating in Syria’s post-war reconstruction. Overall, however, the bilateral economic and geopolitical cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China is stronger than their trilateral relations.
Samore: There’s an ideological element to this as well. The U.S. and Europe see themselves as advancing democracy against autocratic governments, and Russia, China, and Iran are all autocratic governments. But the most important differences are really over Ukraine: the U.S. and the Europeans are trying to defeat Russia, whereas Iran and China are supporting Russia to win or at least not lose the war in Ukraine. Over the last two years, that’s really been the defining international conflict.
For more Crown Center publications on topics covered in this Crown Conversation, see “Iran’s Nuclear Threat in the Biden Era: Israel’s Response Options,” “How Close Is Iran to the Bomb? The Limits of Nuclear Breakout,” and “The Iranian-Chinese Strategic Partnership: Why Now and What it Means.”
The opinions and findings expressed in this Conversation belong to the authors exclusively and do not reflect those of the Crown Center or Brandeis University.
This Crown Conversation was conducted prior to the news of the deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, and other officials in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran on Sunday, May 19, 2024.